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An Alternative and Discretionary § 1367
EDWARD H. COOPER*

Supplemental jurisdiction is a concept too complex to be captured by
complicated statutory drafting. That is my proposition. Or, somewhat more
accurately, that is my tentative proposition, advanced for consideration alongside
the elegant but intricate statutory proposals emerging from the American Law
Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revision Project. Professor John Oakley, the
Reporter, knows more about supplemental jurisdiction, and has thought more
deeply about it, than anyone. He has traveled many roads in continually refining
proposed revisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. If anyone can capture all the nuances of
supplemental jurisdiction in a statute, it is he, assisted by such aid as emerges
from the consultative group, advisers, Council, and annual meeting. But the very
virtuosity of the talents brought to bear suggests that the continuing need for
refinement demonstrates the intransigent problems that defeat detailed
codification. The nuances cannot all be captured by specific provisions that
answer every question. The mediating forces of generality and discretion must be
introduced. All of the drafts recognize this need. The remaining question is
whether an intermediate blend of specification and discretion is the best answer.
The answer depends on at least two things: the conceptualization chosen to
"extend" subject-matterjurisdiction beyond the circumstances that initially define
it, and the wisdom of federal judges in exercising discretion.
I. THE PROPOSAL IN BRIEF
To frame the discussion that follows, let me offer a very rough draft statute cast
in one sentence, with an optional second sentence:
§ 1367. A court that has original jurisdiction of a civil action may implement
the statutory and constitutional purposes that define and limit its jurisdiction
by employing the discretionary concepts of ancillary, pendent, and
supplemental jurisdiction. [The decisions in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S.
545 (1989), and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365

(1978), are repudiated.]
This draft relies on the traditional phrases of ancillary and pendent
"jurisdiction," and adds the newer supplemental "jurisdiction," as a means of
invoking the concepts used first by judges, and then by Congress, to develop the
scope of original jurisdiction. Because the purpose is to return to the course of
evolution through the common-law process ofjudicial elaboration, the traditional

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. The author believes that it would be
redundant to add footnotes as if this were a stand-alone article. Other contributions to this

Symposium will provide all of the conventional citations, and all should be read before turning
to this modest suggestion that perhaps it is better to rely on the common-law process to develop
the concepts of ancillary, pendent, and supplemental jurisdiction. Those who want full-blown
development may look to 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 3523 (2d ed. 1984), and 13B id. §§ 3567-3567.2, together with the current
supplements. The ALI Project that stimulated this Symposium is in any event a remarkably
thorough and wise source of authority as well as analysis and recommendations.
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phrases are justified despite the risk that wrong implications will be read into the
reference to "jurisdiction." What remains is to explore the virtues of relying on
judicial development.
II. THE NATURE OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

The concepts that came to be known as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
evolved without separate statutory authority. They were in some ways more
fundamental than a separate statute might imply. They rested on the statutes that
established subject-matter jurisdiction. Having jurisdiction of something, the
courts had to determine just what they had jurisdiction of. Often enough,
nonjurisdictional issues were inseparable from the matters that established
jurisdiction. These issues were decided as an exercise of the statutory original
jurisdiction, without more ado. Eventually this unavoidable practice evolved into
the more readily avoidable but highly useful concepts of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction. Independent claims, remedies, and even parties came to be within the
evolving expansions of jurisdiction. The justification, however, remained the
same-the courts were making good sense of the statute that established subjectmatter jurisdiction, not creating an independent "jurisdiction" outside of any
statute. The broad run of decisions, moreover, clearly recognized the
discretionary character of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. No attempt was
made to define circumstances in which pendent or ancillary jurisdiction must be
exercised, nor other circumstances in which they must not be exercised.
The origin of the basic subject-matter jurisdiction statutes illuminates the
central purpose of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. These doctrines directly
fulfill the purposes that underlie the grant ofjurisdiction, ensuring that the court
is able to provide full justice. In addition, by enabling the federal courts to
provide a comprehensive litigation package comparable to those available in state
courts of general jurisdiction, these doctrines reduce artificial barriers that might
deter litigants who prefer federal adjudication of matters that support federal
jurisdiction. In the special cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction, these doctrines
provide the only opportunity for coherent litigation of related matters-the Finley
decision was properly overruled by present § 1367, and nothing should be done
that threatens to restore it.
If pendent and ancillary jurisdiction spring from the purposes that animate the
statutes establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction, their limits spring from
the purposes that limit the grants of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Neither
the diversity nor the general federal-question jurisdiction statutes extend to the
limits of Article III, nor even close to those limits. The policies that limit
jurisdiction must be respected as well as the policies that establish it. These
complex policies may be summarized as reflecting respect for state law and the
role of state courts in defining and applying state law. Federal courts may fail to
understand state law, are poorly equipped to develop or change state law, and in
any event cannot act with authority in matters of state law. Federal courts assert
strong and legitimate interests in adhering to federal procedure, and at times may
overlook or choose to ignore the ways in which state substantive law is
interdependent with state procedure. In addition, limits on federal jurisdiction
reflect concern for litigants who prefer state courts not only for authoritative
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disposition of state law but also for reasons of familiarity and convenience. This
concern for party preferences is enhanced when it is proposed to bring into
federal dourt a party who is not subject to any independent basis of federal
jurisdiction. Finally, and not least, federal courts must first husband their
resources to dispose of the matters that establish federal jurisdiction. The
threshold of convenience and fairness that justifies disposition of related matters
must be adjusted accordingly.
It would be better if the scope of original jurisdiction could be worked out as
a continual and often case-specific balancing of these competing policies without
resort to any subordinate but independent "jurisdiction" terminology. The
difficulty, of course, is caused by the ineradicable habit of lawyers to confuse the
meanings and incidents of different concepts that masquerade under a common
label. This habit is encouraged by codifying supplemental jurisdiction in a statute.
Section 1367(a) provides that the district courts "shall have supplemental
jurisdiction." The very codification of the jurisdiction terminology encourages
judges and lawyers to invoke the conveniently hyperbolic adage that existing
jurisdiction cannot be declined.' To be sure, § 1367(c) describes circumstances
in which the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, but
the largely closed category of circumstances that justify this course threatens to
reduce discretion in undesirable ways.
In the face of this threat to discretion, reliance on the traditional phrases,
including the jurisdiction component, reflects the belief that on the whole the
federal courts were doing a good job of implementing the traditional concepts
until the Supreme Court intervened in the Owen and Finley decisions. The Gibbs
decision characterized pendent jurisdiction as "a doctrine of discretion," shaped
on the one hand by "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," and
on the other by comity toward state courts and state law.2 Lower courts exercised
their discretion, as informed by these shaping concerns, intelligently. The Finley
decision-which itself recognized and perhaps even invited the possibility of
legislative repudiation-provided the immediate impetus for enactment of §
1367. In many ways, it would have been better-if only Congress could feel its
way free-to respond, not by attempted codification, but by simple repudiation

1. The classic statement of Chief Justice Marshall is oft-quoted:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should.... We have no more right
to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821).
2. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of
discretion, not of plaintiffs right. Its justification lies in considerations ofjudicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal
court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound
to apply state law to them. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both
as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for
them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.
Id. (citations omitted).
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of the unduly narrowing approaches taken in the Finley decision and also in the
Owen decision.
Nearly a decade has passed, however, under the influence of § 1367. It is too
late simply to repeal present § 1367 and repudiate the Owen and Finley decisions.
But it is not too late to return to an era of discretionary judicial development and
implementation of the policies originally expressed in terms of ancillary and
pendent jurisdiction. That is all the proposed statute aims at. All three adjectives
are used. Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction emphasize continuity with historic
roots. Supplemental jurisdiction recognizes that the never-clear distinction
between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction has largely faded from practicing
usage, and encourages focus on the common purpose that supports both
traditional doctrines.
III. THE DANGERS OF CODIFICATION

The principal papers and other comments in this Symposium, along with a
wealth of earlier literature, explore in exquisite detail the shortcomings of the
present § 1367. Particularly with the benefit of some years of reflection and
experience, it is tempting to apologize that these shortcomings simply illustrate
the ways in which very good drafters, acting in a hurry, may fail to foresee all
ramifications of a complex subject. This apology suggests that the appropriate
cure is revision within the same format, taking account of the afterthoughts. At
least two difficulties must be surmounted to justify this course. The more detailed
difficulty is also the more obvious-there are many possible combinations of
original jurisdiction, claims, and parties. The responsibility of foreseeing all of
them, or even all of the more important ones, and providing wise answers, is
daunting even if it is approached in detailed categories. The more fundamental
difficulty is that the format itself increases the simultaneous risks of being too
broad and too narrow. These difficulties feed on each other.
The difficulties of foresight blend with the drafting challenge. Inescapably clear
drafting requires foreseeing every possible combination of claims and parties that
may arise. Unless that happy state is reached, the best that can be hoped for is that
a statute will speak clearly to all of the circumstances that the drafters have
contemplated. Words that speak clearly to these circumstances, however, can
easily have unintended meaning for circumstances that were not contemplated.
The range of possible unforeseen circumstances defines the gravity of this risk.
And across the full range of federal litigation as we know it, and as we will come
to know it, the range of possible unforeseen circumstances seems broad indeed.
The drafting technique adopted by present § 1367 exacerbates the difficulties
of foresight. It begins in subsection (a) with a blanket provision that establishes
supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of "the same case or controversy under
Article III." Then subsection (b) provides categorical exceptions for cases
founded solely on diversity jurisdiction, and subsection (c) follows these
exceptions with a list of circumstances that allow a district court to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. This structure reinforces the risks that follow
from characterizing the authority to adjudicate supplemental matters as a matter
of "jurisdiction." Exceptions that are limited to diversity cases imply that similar
exceptions are not appropriate in federal-question cases. The necessarily opaque
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list of circumstances that justify refusal to exercise existing supplemental
jurisdiction seems to narrow discretion still further by the terms of the residual
category, which applies when "in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." Some hope may be found in the
Supreme Court's recent discussion of subsection (c), which suggests that it may
be read to confirm the full sweep of discretion recognized by the pre-1990
decisions.3 As desirable as that reading is, the possibility remains that it will not
prevail.
IV. THE RISKS OF DISCRETION

The risks that discretion will be poorly used are different from the risks of
detailed drafting. In some ways they seem greater. We are particularly sensitive
to mistakes in defining federal jurisdiction, whether poor judgment is exercised
to expand or restrict the scope of the court's original jurisdiction. This sensitivity
is rooted in the subordinate role of federal courts, whose very being and
jurisdiction are controlled by Congress. A denial of jurisdiction may seem
shirking, and an assertion may seem usurpation. The argument for discretion in
supplemental jurisdiction cannot be made solely by pointing to the difficulties of
defining the jurisdiction.
Part of the case for discretion is made by reflecting on the brevity of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1332, the statutes that establish general federal-question and
diversity jurisdiction. The meaning of these spare statutes has evolved over
generations into an intricate structure that could not be guessed from their words
alone. Treatises have been filled by the effort to describe the structure, and the
effort continues. Most of this vital jurisprudence has been made by judges, not
Congress. Ifjudges can be-trusted with much of the responsibility for defining the
original jurisdiction, the added responsibility to define supplemental jurisdiction
is readily justified.

3. See City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 118 S. Ct. 523, 533-34
(1997).
Our decisions have established that pendent jurisdiction "is a doctrine of
discretion, not of plaintiff's right," Gibbs, 383 U.S., at 726, and that district

courts can decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims for a number of
valid reasons .... [W]e have indicated that "district courts [should] deal with
cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine." [Carnegie-Melon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 357

(1988).]
The supplemental jurisdiction statute codifies these principles....
... The statute... reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction, "a federal court should consider and weigh in
each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity." [Ia at 350.]
InternationalCollege ofSurgeons, 118 S. Ct. at 533-34 (1997) (second alteration in original)

(citation omitted).
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The positive case for discretion is made by experience with the lower-court
development of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under the liberating influence
of the Gibbs decision. One of the liberating things said by Justice Brennan was
that there is power to hear a whole case "if, considered without regard to their
federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding. ' 4 The full opinion shows that
the "one judicial proceeding" test is shaped not by the rules of claim preclusion
but by the expanding authority conferred by procedural rules that empower
litigants to shape sensible litigation packages according to the needs of their
unique circumstances.5 Whether or not this text was consulted, lower courts began
to work their way toward this functional goal. On the whole, discretion was
exercised wisely. The least functional results flowed from regard for the policy
of complete diversity, a problem that was augmented by the Owen decision. There
is little reason, however, to hope that Congress can make better sense of the
complete diversify policy than courts have done. The political controversies that
swirl around possible restrictions or repeal of diversity jurisdiction are likely to
prevent dispassionate consideration of the best ways to make sense of diversity
jurisdiction so long as it persists. But it may be possible to repeal the Owen
decision, freeing the lower courts to resume the process of gradual development.
And so the question may be repeated as a suggestion: the dangers of detailed
drafting are greater than the dangers of discretion. Supplemental jurisdiction
should be restored to its functional and substantially discretionary roots.
V. OTHER SUGGESTIONS

A brief note may be made of three other issues: the interplay between
supplemental jurisdiction and claim preclusion; the desirability of transfer from
federal courts to state courts; and the need to separate pendent appeal jurisdiction
from supplemental original jurisdiction.
Claim preclusion rules are defined and limited in part by the opportunity to
bring multiple aspects of a single "claim" before a single court. Supplemental
jurisdiction expands the opportunity to advance theories and claim remedies in
a federal court. The greater the degree of discretion that surrounds supplemental
jurisdiction, however, the greater the potential confusion for claim preclusion.
There are many possible combinations of exclusive original federal jurisdiction,
concurrent original federal jurisdiction, and supplemental jurisdiction. It may be
clear that one court, state or federal, can entertain a broader proceeding than the
other. Often a federal court can choose whether to entertain as broad a proceeding
as a state court clearly can entertain. Without attempting to work out the best
claim preclusion rules for these circumstances, 6 it is enough to suggest that the
rules should be controlled by federal law. The consequences of the supplementaljurisdiction power are so tightly bound to federal interests that state courts should

4. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
5. See id.
6. See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4412

(1981).
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not be free to adopt preclusion rules that either expand or reduce the pressure to
invoke supplemental jurisdiction.
Supplemental jurisdiction underscores the desirability of adopting a system that
allows a federal court to transfer state-law matters to a willing state court. The
Uniform Transfer of Litigation Acte provides a framework that could be adopted
by state courts. Implementing federal legislation would free federal courts to
shape supplemental jurisdiction without fear of the great inefficiencies that may
follow discretionary dismissal of a state claim with no other recourse than
institution of a new and independent state action.
Finally, the policies that shape pendent appeal jurisdiction are as different from
the policies that shape supplemental original jurisdiction as all policies of appeal
jurisdiction are different from all policies of original federal jurisdiction. It would
be a grave mistake to analogize from one to the other, except to recognize that
each turns on the need to define the scope of an existing jurisdiction in light of
the relevant defining and restricting policies.

7. UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIGATION AcT, 14 U.L.A. 78 (1992).

